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1. Introduction 
Housing is the most widely held asset and, therefore, an important component of household 
wealth in many European countries. The role of housing is made more complicated by the 
fact that it serves a double purpose: it is both an investment vehicle that allows investors to 
hold home equity and a durable consumption good from which the owner derives utility. 
The  life  cycle  model  of  saving  under  borrowing  constraints  predicts  a  hump  shaped 
homeownership age profile (Artle and Varayia, 1978). The ownership rate increases with age 
as people save and become home-owners, and declines in old age as people draw on their 
housing equity. If individuals want to keep a good standard of living after retirement, they 
should release home equity by either taking up a mortgage, or by downsizing, or both.  
The model is actually complicated by large mobility costs and housing illiquidity: moving 
house involves high transaction costs and this makes the trading infrequent. For this reason it 
is not surprising to find that very high proportions of elderly households own their home all 
over  Europe  (homeownership  rate  is  above  70  percent  for  those  aged  50-79  in  most 
countries). The elderly may see their house as a secure asset in case of need and perceive it as 
a substitute for the purchase of long-term care insurance. Bequest motives can also explain 
the high home-ownership rates in old age: the house is a family asset that can be transmitted 
to the next generation. 
 
Empirical studies, mostly based on US data, find that the elderly are not likely to decumulate 
housing wealth (Venti and Wise, 2004), contrary to the predictions of the life-cycle model of 
consumption and saving. Rather, the evidence suggests that the elderly prefer not to move, 
unless  they  are  forced  to  by  outside  shocks  –  such  as  the  death  of  a  spouse  or  health 
problems. The evidence for other countries is far more limited. Chiuri and Jappelli (2010) use 
repeated cross section data from the Luxembourg Income Study to show that few households   3 
cease to be home-owners late in life. Tatsiramos (2006) is the only systematic attempt to 
study residential mobility in different EU countries, using ECHP data on six countries from 
1994 to 2001. He estimates residential mobility among the elderly to be 1.5 percent per year 
in Southern Europe (Italy and Spain) and 3 percent in Central Europe (France, Germany and 
the Netherlands) and the UK. 
 
This  paper  uses  data  from  the  first  two  waves  of  the  Survey  of  Health,  Ageing  and 
Retirement  in  Europe  (SHARE)  to  investigate  elderly  households'  residential  mobility 
choices  and  the  factors  influencing  them  in  eleven  European  countries.  The  longitudinal 
nature of the data will allow us to study both the decision to move and the changes in housing 
consumption of those who move. This topic is very relevant because the decisions of large 
“baby-boom” cohorts turning into a “papy-boom” will have consequences on the housing 
market, not only for those cohorts and for the future generations of elderly, but also for the 
younger cohorts.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the data and we assess the 
importance of residential mobility. In section 3 we study its determinants, distinguishing the 
mobility  between  private  ordinary  dwellings  from  that  to  nursing  homes  and  analysing 
separately tenants and home-owners. In section 4 we study the housing adjustments made by 
those individuals who move and in section 5 we conclude.  
2. Residential mobility in old age 
To study residential mobility of the elderly we draw data from the 2004 and 2006 waves of 
the  Survey  of  Health,  Ageing  and  Retirement  in  Europe  (SHARE).  This  survey  collects 
extensive information on health, socioeconomic status and family interactions of individuals 
aged  50  and  over  in  eleven  European  countries,  ranging  from  Scandinavia  to  the   4 
Mediterranean: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), France (FR), Germany (DE), 
Greece (GR), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE) and Switzerland (CH).  
Table 1 presents the sample of individuals who were interviewed in both waves.  
Table 1. Description of the longitudinal sample 50 + 
 
  Immobile  To private dwelling  To nursing home  total 
Sweden  1 702  163  14  1 879 
Denmark  1 041  88  23  1 152 
Germany  1 407  47  7  1 461 
The Netherlands  1 509  57  10  1 576 
Belgium  2 592  40  21  2 653 
France  1 796  46  9  1 851 
Switzerland  619  27  6  652 
Austria  1 160  14  7  1 181 
Spain  1 169  42  4  1 215 
Italy  1 627  52  0  1 679 
Greece  2 153  17  0  2 170 
All  16 775  593  101  17 469 
In  percent  96,0  3.4  0.6  100,0 
N.B. The longitudinal sample comprises 17 469 individuals aged 50 or more. Among them 593 moved home 
(ordinary/private dwelling) and 101 entered a nursing home between wave 1 and wave 2. Those who lived in 
nursing home in wave 1 are excluded  
 
The longitudinal nature of the survey allows estimating the annual residential mobility rate of 
the 50 + and understanding what motivates their choices. Mobility rates can be estimated 
mainly  in  two  ways.  First,  without  using  the  longitudinal  aspect  of  the  survey,  we  can 
measure mobility from the information on the number of years respondents have been living 
in their home: the results show that the percentage of individuals who have been living in 
their current accommodation for less than two years is 2.6 in 2004 and 2.6 in the 2006. 
Second, the annual mobility rate can be estimated by using the information on residential 
mobility  between  the  two  survey  waves,  as  declared  by  respondents
1.  The proportion of 
mobile individuals is 4 percent. To estimate the annual mobility rate, one should take into 
account that the time span between the two survey waves, which is on average 28 months, 
varies substantially both within and across countries, from a minimum of 11 months to a 
                                                       
1 We use the question „Did you move since <date of previous interview> ?‟    5 
maximum of 40 months. Once we apply this correction, we obtain a mean annual rate equal 
to  1.7  percent  (Figure  1).  However,  attrition  can  be  particularly  serious  here  since 
respondents who moved between the two waves might have been particularly difficult to 
retrieve and, therefore, dropped out of the sample. To overcome this problem, we use data 
from  the  sample  management  system  to  try  to  identify  those  households  who  were  not 
retrieved  in  2006  but  presumably  moved
2. When these households are included in the 
computation, the estimated mobility rate is 2   percent  at the household level (figure 2, 
unweighted). Hence, all measures converge to a low residential mobility rate of around  2 
percent per year. The country rates go from 4.4 percent in Denmark and Sweden to 1 percent 
in Austria and 0.3 percent in Greece.
3 In most countries, mobility is found to decrease with 
age, with an important rebound after age 80, as people move to nursing homes (figure 1) and 
the mean annual mobility rate increases to 3 percent. In the Netherlands and in Belgium, the 
mobility rate is higher among the 60 -69 than the 50-59, which might be due to retirement 
mobility.  
                                                       
2 Interviewers have to code the reason why they could not contact the household. We consider those households 
that could not be retrieved because they moved (often to an unknown address). 
3 These rates are not far from those of Tatsiramos (2006) from  ECHP 1994-2001, except for some countries. 
Germany is at the same level as Denmark according to the ECHP, which does not follow individual in nursing 
homes.   6 
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3. The determinants of residential mobility 
The longitudinal nature of SHARE and the unique feature that individuals were followed into 
nursing homes provide precious information on what determines residential mobility and on 
the choices made by those who move, despite the small sample size of movers. Our intuition 
is that moving from one private accommodation to another is very different from moving to a 
nursing home. The first type of mobility is largely a free choice, while the second is often a 
forced choice. We identify the difference by testing if, taking into account mobility costs, 
more resources make mobility between homes easier, while it has less influence, or even a 
reversed effect on moving to an institution.  
 
3.1 Habit formation 
We first present a series of Probit models analysing the probability to have moved from a 
private dwelling to another one between the two survey waves (Table 2). Our data allow us to 
control for a large number of variables, including demographic characteristics (age, marital 
status,  household  size,  presence  of  children),  socio-economic  status  (income,  wealth, 
economic activity), health housing quality (whether the individual lives in a house or a flat, in 
a rural area or in a city, in a crime-ridden neighbourhood) and the country of residence. 
A  well-known  general  result  is  that  residential  mobility  declines  with  age  as  housing 
consumption is progressively adjusted along the life-cycle; this can be seen in column 1 of 
Table 2. Among the 50 +, those aged 50-59 are the most mobile. What is less studied, for 
lack of longitudinal data, is the way mobility also depends on the time one has spent in the 
same home (Boehm and Schlottmann, 2006). For this reason, in our model we also control 
for the number of years spent in the same accommodation
4. Among the 50+, the more time 
spent in the home, the less likely one is to leave it, at a given age. This negative effect 
                                                       
4 In all models we introduce as explanatory the number of months between the two survey waves and country 
dummies.    8 
appears in columns 2 to 5 of Table 2: ten more years spent in the same accommodation 
reduce the probability of moving by 0.5 point. Once the length of tenure is introduced, age 
has an effect on mobility only after age 80, when some decide to move (column 2). And even 
this old age effect loses its significance when other control variables are introduced, such as 
income and homeownership (column 3), or marital status (columns 4 and 5)
5. These results 
show that it is not age per se that matters but length of tenure.  
 
A homeowner is less likely to move than a tenant because her mobility costs are higher, as 
they include higher transaction costs, and because houses tend to be more adapted to owner-
occupiers, who can arrange it to their taste, than to tenants. However, the tenure effect cannot 
be interpreted as casual because there is endogenous selection due to the fact that owner-
occupation is not chosen by individuals or households who plan to move soon. Nevertheless, 
the  high  rates  of  home-ownership  among  the  elderly  Europeans  can  be  proven  to  be  an 
obstacle to mobility. We also find that, because of mobility costs, a higher income helps to 
move, and so do higher savings
6.  
                                                       
5 For the list of all control variables, see footnotes of table 2. 
6 Income is introduced via 4 dummies for each household income quartile, estimated at the national level. 
Wealth  is  PPP-adjusted  net  household  wealth.  All  standard  errors  in  estimations  account  for  clustered 
observations in a household in case of couples.   9 
Table 2. Residential mobility between private dwellings (marginal effects) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Age 50-59  0.010**  0.003  0.005  0.001  0.003 
Age 60-69  0.003  -0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000 
Age 70-79   Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
Age 80 +  0.007  0.010*  0.006  0.003  0.003 
Nb of years in home_w1 (x10)  -0.007***  -0.005***  -0.005***  -0.005*** 
 
Income         
1
st quartile_w1    Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
2
nd quartile_w1    0.001  0.005  0.005 
3
rd quartile_w1    0.003  0.009*  0.009* 
4




    2.31**  2.20**  2.23** 
Owner-occupier_w1    -0.035***  -0.032***  -0.032*** 
Crime in neighbourhood_w1    0.007  0.007 
Rural_w1        -0.010***  -0.009*** 
House_w1        0.008**  0.008** 
           
Married_w1        -0.003  -0.003 
Single_w1        Ref.  Ref. 
Partner_w1       -0.004  -0.004 
Widowed_w1        0.011  0.011 
Divorced_w1        0.017*  0.017* 
Recent widowed      0.016  0.015 
Recent divorced       0.185***  0.192*** 
           
Child departure        0.024***  0.024*** 
Household size increases      0.032***  0.032*** 
Household size decreases      0.001  0.000 
Motor limitation_w1      0.008*  0.007* 
Motor limitation      -0.000  -0.001 
Special equipment      -0.009**  -0.009** 
           
Improved economic situation        0.022*** 
Deteriorated economic situation       0.005 
           
Passage to inactivity        0.008 
Inactive in w1 and w2 
          0.008** 
Pseudo R²  0,060  0,072  0,092  0.116  0.122 
Number of observations  17 469  17 469  17 469  17 469  17 469 
 
Note. Probit model. Dependent variable: “has moved between two private dwellings between the two waves of 
SHARE”. We also introduce other control variables (not shown to save space). Significant: number of months 
between the two waves, country dummies (col. 1 to 5); non-significant (col. 4 and 5): number of rooms in wave 
1,  gender,  bad  self-assessed  health  in  w1,  in  w2,  dummies  for  the  number  of  children.  Child  departure  = 
coresidence with a child in w1, no coresidence with a child in w2.  
The estimated coefficients are marginal effects (for a dummy variable it is the effect of going from 0 to 1). * 10 
percent significant, ** 5 percent significant; *** 1 percent significant. 
   10 
3.2 Mobility and tenure 
To understand more about the wealth effect we test a specification where we allow tenants 
and owner-occupiers to have different constraints and behaviours. In Table 3 we estimate the 
same model as in Table 2 but separately for owner-occupiers and tenants and we interact the 
tenure decision in 2006 with wealth
7. The results show that the income effect is positive and 
significant only for tenants. Those who belong to the highest income quartile are more likely 
to have moved. Conversely, wealth has no effect on the residential mobility of a tenant, 
whereas it makes it more likely for an owner-occupier to move. This result can be explained 
by the fact that most of the wealth of the elderly Europeans is in their home (Christelis et al., 
2008); higher wealth translates into higher housing value, which  ceteris paribus induces to 
sell the home and move. Table 3 also shows that the effect of the number of years spent in the 
current home is stronger for tenants than for owner-occupiers. Even if overall tenants are 
more mobile, in most countries moving home often implies losing a rent discount, especially 
if rents are controlled or subsidized. Unfortunately in SHARE tenants are not asked whether 
they live in public or social housing and we cannot delve deeper into this question.  
 
Moving can also be a response to shocks in income, household size, health and to changes in 
tastes and preferences that make current housing less adapted to new circumstances. Some 
factors are clearly linked to the life cycle. Retirement, or the fact of being retired induces 
some owner-occupiers to move, but  it has no  significant effect  on tenants.  One possible 
explanation is that the decision to retire is also financially constrained and easier for those 
who own a house that can be traded for another one, rather than for tenants. To estimate the 
effect of a change in income, we use the information from a subjective question that asks 
                                                       
7 We have tested that the differences we comment are significant on a single model with interaction of all 
variables with an ownership dummy.   11 
respondents how their economic situation evolved since the last survey
8. For owner-occupiers 
a deterioration in their financial situation does not induce a move: on the contrary, moving 
seems  to be  linked to better economic conditions. The mobility rate  of owner-occupiers 
between  the  two  waves
9,  which  is  2.1   percent  when  there  is  no  improvement  or  a 
deterioration in the household economic conditions, rises to 5.7  percent when the economic 
conditions get better. The case of tenants is more complex. Both those whose s ituation 
improved and those whose situation got worse moved more
10. This difference could be linked 
to the fact that some tenants were forced to move. This interesting result would have to be 
confirmed in future waves of the survey.  
 
For owner-occupiers, being widowed increases the probability of residential mobility. Bonnet 
et al. (2010) attribute the residential mobility of widows to the necessity for a surviving 
spouse to adjust her housing consumption to her new resources, new needs or to the 
anticipation of future care needs in the absence of a spouse. They show that French widows 
tend to move closer to cities and to their children. It could also be the case that inheritance 
laws force a surviving parent to share the estate with her children, hence sell  the home. To 
test this hypothesis, we interact the widowhood dummy with a dummy for childlessness. 
Indeed  owner-occupier  widows  without  children  are  less  mobile  than  those  who  have 
children, which is compatible with inheritance sharing, but also with the  will to move closer 
to the children. The sample size is too small to distinguish between these two motives. Being 
divorced or having recently divorced since has also a positive effect on residential mobility. 
 
                                                       
8 The question is „Since we last interviewed you in <month and year previous interview>, would you say your 
household's financial situation today has... 1. Greatly improved  2. Somewhat improved 3. Remained the same 
4. Somewhat deteriorated 5. Greatly deteriorated‟. We group together categories 1 and 2 (improvement) and 
categories 4 and 5 (deterioration). 
9 Non-corrected for the length of time between the two survey waves. 
10  Omitting the variable  does not change qualitatively the income coefficients  both for home-owners and 
tenants.   12 
On the pooled sample the number of children has no significant effect on the probability to 
move.  However,  this  result  changes  when  we  distinguish  between  tenants  and  owner-
occupiers (Table 3). Among the owner-occupiers, those who have no children are the most 
mobile (3.5 percent versus 2.4 percent on average), while the reverse is true for tenants. 
Tenants with four or more children move more than average (9.7 percent versus 6.9 percent). 
The  departure  of  the  last  child  from  the  parental  home  induces  to  adjust  housing 
consumption, both for owner-occupiers and for tenants. This result is the reverse of what is 
found by Debrand and Taffin (2005) in France. Indeed if we estimate the model by group of 
countries we find that the variable is only significant in Northern and Southern Europe. Again 
the sample sizes are too small to document more the origin of country differences.  
A low self-reported health status has no influence on residential mobility, but having at least 
three limitations with mobility, arm function and fine motor function in 2004 induces owner-
occupiers to move.  
Once  all  the  control  variables  have  been  introduced,  Sweden  and  Denmark  remain  the 
countries where the elderly are the most mobile, Greece that one where they are the less.   13 
Table 3. Mobility of owner-occupiers and of tenants (marginal effects) 
  (1)  (2) 
  owner-occupiers w1  tenants w1 
Age 50-59   0.002  0.015 
Age 60-69  -0.000  0.005 
Age 70-79   ref  ref 
Age 80 +  0.002  0.010 




st quartile_w1  ref  ref 
2
nd quartile_w1  0.002  0.015 
3
rd quartile_w1  0.005  0.018 
4
th quartile_w1 
  0.004  0.046** 
Net wealth_w1 x10
 9  8.77***  2,08 
Owner-occupier_v2*Net wealth_w1  -8.24***  4.15 
Crime in neighbourhood_w1  0.005  0.018 
Very large city_w1  -0.008**  0.012 
Suburbs of a large city_w1  ref  ref 
Large city_w1  -0.006*  0.025* 
Small city_w1  -0.002  0.012 
Rural_w1  -0.010***  0.009 
House_w1  0.004  0.011 
Married_w1  -0.002  -0.008 
Single_w1  ref  ref 
Partners_w1  0.002  -0.024 
Widowed_w1  0.020*  -0.001 
(widowd_w1==1)* No child  -0.011***  0.004 
Divorce_w1  0.029  0.002 
Recently widowed  0.006  0.022 
Recently divorced  0.201***  0.147** 
     
Child departure  0.014**  0.066** 
Household size increases  0.007  0.124*** 
Household size decreases  0.001  0.002 
 
No children  0.012*  -0.006 
1 child  0.001  -0.004 
2 children  -0.002  0.014 
3 children  ref  ref 
4 children or more  0.000  0.031** 
     
Motor limitation_w1  0.008**  0.002 
Motor limitation  -0.002  0.004 
Special equipment  -0.005  -0.015 
     
Improved economic situation   0.016***  0.036*** 
Deteriorated economic situation   -0.001  0.025*** 
Passage to inactivity  0.010*  -0.001 
Inactive in w1 and w2  0.008***  0.005 
     
Pseudo R
2     0.1510  0.1012 
Number of observations  13 277  4 192   14 
3.3 Moving to a nursing home 
Moving between private homes is definitely very different from moving to a nursing home. 
Therefore, in Table 4 we estimate separately the decision to move to a nursing home. Note 
that no respondent in Italy or Greece moved to a nursing home: indeed in these countries 
there are few such institutions and the elderly tend to stay at home or with their children
11.  
Table 4. Residential mobility towards a nursing home (marginal effects) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  All countries  SE DK  Rest 
Age 50-59   -0.002  0.003  -0.003** 
Age 60-69   -0.001  -0.002  -0.001 
Age 70-79        
Age 80 +  0.009***  0.012**  0.006*** 
 
Income       
1
st quartile_w1  0.002**  0.005  0.002** 
       
No close family  0.004**  0.008  0.002* 
Recently widowed  0.007**  0.024**  0.003* 
Motor limitation_w1  0.004***  0.011**  0.002*** 
Motor limitation   0.002**  0.001  0.002** 
       
Pseudo R²  0.1694  0.1384  0.1950 
Number of observations  14 491  3 217  11 274 
 
Note. Probit model. Dependent variable: “has moved between to a nursing home between the two waves of 
SHARE”. Other control variables not shown: country dummies, number of months between the two surveys, 
numbers of years spent in the dwelling. The estimated coefficients are marginal effects. * 10 percent significant, 
** 5 percent significant; *** 1 percent significant. 
 
The results show that moving to a nursing home happens only after age 80 (see also Figure 
1). Such a change is more likely, ceteris paribus, for those with mobility limitations, and 
those who have neither a spouse, nor any living child. Having lost a spouse since the previous 
survey wave is a strong determinant of a transition to a nursing home; such transition can 
follow  the  bereavement  closely.  The  finding  that  moving  to  a  nursing  home  is  mostly 
triggered by age, bad health and the absence of close family is not new in the literature 
(Friedman, 1996, Gaymu et al. 2007). However, SHARE allows adding a third determinant, 
namely a low income. Indeed, moving to a nursing home is more frequent for those who are 
                                                       
11 Even in the other countries, sample size is low and the results to be taken with caution.   15 
in the first income quartile, a result in line with what found on US data by Börsch-Supan et 
al. (1990). More should be known on the supply of long-term care and its financing, and the 
SHARE sample is too small to reach clear cut conclusions. However, it is probable that both 
family and economic circumstances play a role in the housing choices of the elderly needing 
long-term care in most European countries. 
To  summarize,  moving  between  private  dwellings  is  motivated  by  housing  quality  and 
mobility costs, whereas moving to an institution is determined by age, health and family 
situation. Moreover, the effect of economic conditions plays in opposite directions. 
 
4. Housing adjustments 
Along the life cycle, adjustments are from small flats to larger houses at the time of marriage 
and the arrival of children. Then adjustments are very rare, but one would expect the choice 
of smaller dwellings as children leave the parental house or a spouse dies, especially if the 
home was a saving device, and if the need to use this saving is present. However, the issue of 
«downsizing», i.e. the decrease in housing consumption in old age, is still debated (Laferrère, 
2006; Banks et al., 2007).  
 
According to SHARE, even if the number of mobile individuals is not high, their demand is 
clearly for smaller homes, especially at older ages. Individuals aged 50-59 move to homes 
with 0.3 rooms less on average; those aged 60 to 69 lose 0.7 rooms; they lose 0.8 rooms when 
aged 70-79 and 1.4 rooms if they are 80 or older. Such reduction in the number of rooms 
often goes with moving to a flat and to the rental sector. Indeed, a majority of movers choose 
a flat rather than a house, which becomes more common with age: the proportion of movers 
choosing a flat goes from 47  percent in the age group 50-59 to 63  percent for the 80 +.   16 
In Table 5
12 we analyse the factors that lead movers to choose a smaller home (column 1) or a 
flat (column 2).  
Table 5. Choice of the number of rooms or of type of dwelling among movers (marginal effects) 
  (1)  (2) 
  less rooms  To a flat 
   
Age 50-59   ref  ref 
Age 60-69   0.008  -0.003 
Age 70-79   0.051  0.047 
Age 80 +  0.204***  0.178*** 
 
Income     
1
st quartile_w1  ref  ref 
2
nd quartile_w1  -0.017  -0.124** 
3
rd quartile_w1  0.131**  -0.122* 
4
th quartile_w1  0.069  -0.170** 
     
Household size increases  -0.239***  -0.116 
Household size decreases  0.214***  -0.163** 
     
Widowed_w1  0.147**  0.116** 
Recently widowed  -0.068  0.291*** 
Divorce_w1  -0.008  0.063 
Recently divorced   0.114  -0.160 
     
Bad health_w1  0.051  0.005 
Bad health  -0.015  0.034 
Motor limitation_w1  0.031  0.034 
Motor limitation  0.010  0.062 
     
To rent  0.244***  0.224*** 
Less rooms    0.184*** 
To a flat  0.189***   
Pseudo R²  0.175  0.2016 
Number of observations  788  788 
 
Note. Probit model. Dependent variable: “has decreased the number of rooms/has chosen a flat between the two 
waves of SHARE (mobile individuals)”. Other control variables: country dummies, number of months between 
the  two  surveys.  Age  is  age  in  wave  1.  *  10  percent  significant,  **  5  percent  significant;  ***  1  percent 
significant. 
 
Moving  to  smaller  accommodation  is  not  linked  to  income  or  bad  health,  but  to  age, 
widowhood and in general a reduction in household size. Old age and widowhood are also 
                                                       
12 Table 5 and 6 only have descriptive value and do not model simultaneous decisions of mobility and change in 
housing consumption.   17 
associated with moving to a flat but in this case low income does play a role. This result can 
be explained by the fact that people leave houses for flats to reduce care and maintenance 
costs. 
Table 6. Choice of the rental sector among movers (marginal effects) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
 
owner-
occupiers   tenants  All 
50-59   ref  ref  ref 
60-69   0.099  0.003  0.067 
70-79   0.254***  0.065*  0.199*** 
80 +  0.449***  0.107***  0.313*** 
 
Income       
1
st quartile_w1  ref  ref   
2
nd quartile_w1  -0.111  -0.102*  -0.119* 
3
rd quartile_w1  -0.218**  -0.111  -0.185** 
4
th quartile_w1  -0.264***  -0.324***  -0.327*** 
       
Household size increases  0.173  -0.039  0.015 
Household size decreases  0.216**  -0.033  0.046 
       
Widowed_w1  -0.111  0.051  0.008 
Divorce_w1  0.104  -0.038  0.040 
Recently widowed  -0.080  0.067  0.141 
Recently divorced   0.054    0.186 
       
Bad health_w1  0.033  -0.020  0.014 
Bad health  0.053  0.019  0.023 
Motor limitation_w1  0.115*  0.045  0.094* 
Motor limitation  -0.080  0.032  -0.035 
       
Less rooms  0.131*  0.047  0.104* 
To flat  0.500***  0.158***  0.381*** 
       
Owner-occupier in w1      -0.365*** 
       
Pseudo R²  0.3618  0.3454  0.3708 
Number of observations  444  354  798 
 
Note. Probit model. Age is age in wave 1. Dependent variable: “chose to rent in w2 (mobile individuals)”. Other control 
variables: country dummies, number of months between the two surveys. 
* 10 percent significant, ** 5 percent significant; *** 1 percent significant. 
 
In Table 6 we  analyse  the factors associated with the choice of the rental sector among 
movers. Even if the overall rate of owner-occupiers does not decrease substantially between   18 
the two waves, 32 percent of mobile owner-occupiers abandon ownership, while only 24 
percent of mobile tenants become owner-occupiers. Renting increases with age after age 70 
and diminishes when income is higher, both for those who were tenants and for previous 
owner-occupiers. Renting is correlated to the choice of a flat and to the decline in the number 
of rooms. Widowhood, divorce, and also the existence of mobility problems, increase the 
choice of renting over owning. Being a tenant implies less management and maintenance care 
for a person living alone, or anticipating the onset of age-related disabilities.  
 
To understand residential mobility, it is interesting to analyse, even if only at a descriptive 
level, the characteristics of housing and the reasons for moving (Table 7).  
Table 7. Reasons given for moving by age 
  All   50-59  60-69  70-79  80 et + 
Family reasons   17.5  21.7  9,0  9.1  35.6 
Professional reasons  2.4  5.8  1,0  0,0  0,0 
Wanted bigger/smaller/different dwelling  37.1  45.5  37.7  30.7  22.9 
Wanted to change region  7.5  6.1  9.6  8.5  5.2 
Other reason  35.3  21,0  42.7  50.3  36.3 
Does not know  0.3  0,0  0,0  1.4  0,0 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
 
The data show that residential mobility is accompanied by an improvement in housing special 
features that assist persons who have physical impairments or health problems. Among the 
non-movers,  only 6 percent  live in  homes equipped for old  age. Among movers,  only  3 
percent of them were living in a home with special features in 2004, but the percentage 
increases to 19 percent in 2006, which provides evidence in favour of the idea that adapting 
the home to the needs of old age is one of the main reasons to move. Indeed, when explicitly 
asked for the reason for moving
13, 37.1 percent mention they wanted a different home (Table 
7).  This is the most common reason,  followed by  “other  reasons”  (35.3  percent),  which 
probably includes health-related reasons and the desire to reduce housing costs, and “family 
                                                       
13 The question was only asked to those who did not move to a nursing home.   19 
reasons”  (17.5  percent).  The  desire  to  change  region  only  comes  in  fourth  position  (7.4 
percent) and, as expected in this age group, professional reasons come last (2.4 percent).  
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we analyse residential mobility of the elderly, using data on eleven European 
countries from the first two waves of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. 
A  unique  feature  of  the  dataset  is  that  it  allows  distinguishing  mobility  between  private 
dwellings from mobility to a nursing home. Our results show that moving to another private 
accommodation  depends  on  housing  quality  and  mobility  costs,  whereas  moving  to  an 
institution is determined by age, bad health and the absence of close family. Moreover, the 
effect of economic conditions plays in opposite direction: while mobility between private 
dwellings is positively associated to  wealth, moving to a nursing home is more frequent 
among those in the lowest income quartile. 
We  find  some  evidence  that  those  who  move  tend  to  reduce  housing  consumption,  as 
predicted by the life-cycle theory. Indeed, especially among the low income group, movers 
are  more  likely  to  choose  smaller  homes  and  to  prefer  flats  to  houses  and  renting  than 
owning.  The  consequences  on  the  housing  market  of  the  ageing  of  large  baby-boomer 
cohorts, both in terms of supply and demand, might be important, if not anticipated. 
Overall, the annual residential mobility rate of the European aged 50+ is very low, around 2 
percent. One could ask whether residential mobility will grow or slow down, according to the 
preferences and constraints of the new generations of retirees. Up to now, there is some 
evidence that in France the residential mobility of the 65-75 has rather decreased (Laferrère, 
2007) but the movement could be reversed. The public policy implications are many, as the 
markets will be impacted in many ways: supply of houses, demand of flats, of equipments 
and services for old age. 
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